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Abstract: This article auto-ethnographically explores my experiences over the 
course of several years as I transitioned from able bodied, to frequent cane user, 
who used a scooter to attend academic conferences, to a user of robotic 
telepresence. I discuss the different affordances that those technologies allow, 
issues of embodiment, articulation work, agency, and ableism. The telepresence 
robot did not “fix me” as is often implicated with the medical model of disability 
(Thomson, 1997), or augment my experience to make it more palatable to the 
able-bodied majority. Instead, it allowed me to make conscious trade-offs 
between the affordances of my corporeal body and an emergent cyborg-self in the 
context of a degenerative auto-immune disease. Thus, in writing this article it is 
my intention to improve the social acceptance of the disabled cyborg-person, and 
through improved design to I aim to afford disabled persons choices.  
1 Introduction  
For three beautiful days during Ubicomp one fall, I could walk at a brisk pace for 
six hours at a time. I could nimbly weave through crowds, and I could look people 
in the eye. I became a cyborg. My flesh body was in Philadelphia, whereas my 
other body was in Seattle, and my mind was somewhere in between, or neither. 
Scooters, wheelchairs and canes replaced by this other embodiment, I felt free. 
This essay auto-ethnographically reflects on my experiences using a telepresence 
robot. I have used this approach because reflexivity is critical to understanding 
this experience, and it allows me to address these issues in ways that a positivist 
approach would not. In doing so I hope to address issues of embodiment, 
articulation work, agency, and ableism with the intention of improving the social 
acceptance of the cyborg, and its design to afford disabled persons’ choices.  
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2 Method 
In this paper, I will auto-ethnographically discuss my experiences since 
September 2014 with telepresence robots. The way an anthropologist represents 
oneself is a significant issue in applying anthropologic methods (Geertz, 1988). 
One needs to simultaneously give oneself authority and credibility by illustrating 
one was  really there, but at the same time accurately representing the culture of 
the people one is  studying. Much debate exists on the benefits of “objective” 
distant realists accounts as compared to reflexive accounts where the role of the 
author is discussed (Geertz, 1988). Elsewhere in my work, I have argued for the 
importance of reflexive practice in ethnography studies of technology use (Rode, 
2011). Auto-ethnography is an anthropological method that tries to resolve these 
tensions; it is a practice which Van Maanen describes as a “wet term signalling 
the cultural study of one’s own people” (1988, p106). Often this is done to give 
authentic voice to marginalized groups, whose voices may have previously been 
tempered through anthropological tales told by academics from dominant groups 
(Duncan, 2008; Ellis et al, 2010). Here I write about myself as an representative of 
an emergent group of disabled persons embracing this potentially transformative 
technology. Disability experience is central to critical disabilities studies and 
auto-ethnography in particular is a common technique (Smith and Sparkes, 2008; 
Richards, 2008). In this way, through my own experiences, I aim to study an 
emergent culture of disabled telepresence users.  
My first experience with a telepresence robot was borrowing a Suitable 
Technologies’ Beam system to attend the Ubicomp Conference in Seattle 
remotely. Afterwards, I purchased my own telepresence robot which I placed in 
my lab in the US and later the UK. I will discuss my own usage experiences in the 
context of my disability, as well as my colleagues using my robot to visit me. 
I purchased my own robot using funds generously provided by the American 
National Science Foundation. I felt it allowed me to socially-construct a different 
experience of my disability. I have called in to the office using the robot on days I 
did not feel well enough to leave the sofa; I have also found myself in the office, 
and yet sending the robot down the hall to talk to a colleague. Yet, I do not 
condone a medical model of disability. The telepresence robot did not “fix me” or 
augment my experience to make it more palatable to the able-bodied majority. 
Instead, it allowed me to make conscious trade-offs between the affordances of 
my corporeal body and my increased awareness of my cyborg-self in the context 
of a degenerative auto-immune disease. I am using Haraway’s (1991) feminist 
STS definition of cyborg, “a creature simultaneously animal and machine, who 
populate worlds” rather than the AI community’s usage of the term. Haraway 
(1991) argues that we have all always been cyborgs and focuses on dissolving this 
animal/machine hybrid. Given that society creates a boundary between able-
bodied and disabled in that disability is socially constructed, hers is an 
appropriate theoretical framework for examining disability. Thus, in this paper I 
have embraced and explored my identity as a human-computer hybrid; a cyborg. 
In exploring this boundary, I have learned to take an activist stance on my 
(dis)ability.  
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My disability results in profound fatigue, difficulty walking and painful 
breathing during flares, while at other times I appear wholly able-bodied. The 
transition between these two states can be gradual or can occur suddenly. Thus, I 
am simultaneously negotiating my changing experiences as a cyborg and as a 
person with a disability in concert with one another. 
All Beam interactions were documented in short session observation notes or 
“jottings” in ethnographic parlance (Emerson et al, 1995), supplemented with 
screenshots of the Beam User Interface. The session observations were extended 
to provide ethnographic field notes following each session. The data were open 
coded to explore telepresence use in light of existing human-computer interaction 
(HCI) theory. I employed an abductive, qualitatively analysis across iterative 
coding cycles (Emerson et al., 1995) to explore issues such as embodiment, 
articulation work, agency, and ableism. My analysis ended when I reached 
theoretical saturation – that is when no new information on usage practice was 
revealed by further analysis. 
3 System Description 
The Beam Telepresence system consists of a video screen mounted on a five-foot 
shaft connected to wheels. As the person who is connecting remotely, I can then 
drive the Beam as I like and my image is displayed on the video screen. Local 
attendees can move the Beam only by physically pushing it.  
 
  
Fig. 1 (a) U.S. President Obama with disability rights activist Alice Wong. Photo credit: 
Pete Souza, Chief Official White House Photographer (b) Diagram with sizes of Beam 
system and docking station. Photo credit: Suitable Technologies 
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The beam user and local attendees can hear each other via  a microphone and 
speaker. The Beam has two cameras, one at near eye level for communication, and 
another which is lit and pointed down at the ground to aid with navigation. The 
user interface allows one to monitor these two cameras, plus the camera on your 
own computer (see Figure 2 a). One can drive with a touchpad (my preference) 
through a mouse or USB Microsoft Xbox controller can be used. To aid in 
navigation, one can plot a planned course in the lower navigation window, so that 
one can plot your intended path, which is especially helpful on turns. 
 
   
Fig. 2 (a) The view from my computer consisting of three windows, described counter 
clockwise from the top. The large window is the communication camera view. The smaller 
window is the navigation camera. Finally, the partial window is for monitoring your own 
camera. I moved it partially off screen, though later learned it could be minimized. (b) Here 
navigation tracking is turned on in the lower navigation window so that you can see your 
current planned course. This is especially helpful on turns. Photo credits: author. 
4 FINDINGS 
4.1 In the beginning… of “bots and beings” 
On my first day as a robot, I felt a bit like a celebrity hounded by paparazzi as I 
searched for the room holding the first conference session with the aid of a hotel 
map. Some asked me for a photo, but others took one without permission leaving 
me feeling objectified and violated. This is akin to Thomson’s discussions of the 
disabled persons often being a dehumanized object of curiosity (1997). Scores of 
people photographed me. My disabled body was a spectacle.  
On entering the room for my session, a senior colleague, Jane, came up and 
helpfully attempted to direct me to the “blue box,” a robot seating zone in the 
back of the room. This area had been designated such that we robots did not tower 
over the seated fully-human attendees. After the spectacle of my arrival, it was 
reassuring to come across someone whom I knew. It made me feel grounded and 
cut through the surreal nature of my experience. It left me feeling that this far off 
space was connected to people with whom I had once had embodied experiences.  
I saw a dear friend, Lawrence, and excused myself, though Jane was concerned 
that I might not be able to find the “blue box”, which was admittedly hard to see 
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in comparison to the very gaudy carpet. Lawrence promised he would indeed help 
me find the blue box. Again, people were watching and snapping photos. I was a 
spectacle, but really, I just wanted to talk to a dear friend. Lawrence, gently 
explained that I was “shouting” and estimated that I was speaking at a volume 
that could be heard from three meters away. I blushed, ashamed of my faux pas, as 
I learned to regulate my newfound voice in a world where I could not truly hear 
myself. Finally, I achieved a “reasonably private” conversation and we got to 
catch up. It was lovely to see him, but as he requested and took a selfie with me, I 
recognized how the lack of a greeting hug made me aware of my dual body. 
Finally, as the session was about to start, I moved to the “blue box”, and 
encountered my first other cyborg. I had trouble recognizing my colleague, and 
folks were fascinated by two robots having a conversation and more photos 
ensued. Later, as I encountered another cyborg, I jotted, 
“Neither J nor I could tell the other was moving so as we approached one another 
we bumped. It was kind of funny, but awkward. The whole conversation was 
strained. We do not know each other well, but suddenly had this shared experience 
and forced intimacy of being ‘bots’ amongst the ‘beings’.” (Fieldnotes) 
As I became more adept at the articulation work (Gerson and Star, 1986) of 
manipulating my robot body, I gained control of my voice and movements and it 
became a part of me. While I may have always been a cyborg, I only gradually 
started to identify with both new limitations and new abilities. 
 
   
Fig. 3 (a) Meeting another ‘bot’. Note it is wholly unclear to whom I am talking. Also, 
note the man photographing this encounter without consent. (b) the “Blue Box” with three 
Beams watching the speaker. Note the oblique angle rendering the slides impossible to read 
and the speaker entirely in shadow. Photo credits: author. 
I could zip about from place to place and talk to colleagues without the walk 
tiring me and fatigue making my arguments less crisp.  
I could look someone in the eye, rather than peering up at them from a scooter 
or wheelchair. Since most conversations at my conferences, especially receptions 
and coffee breaks, occur standing, this was profoundly empowering. 
Still, getting from floor to floor was problematic. Elevators act as Faraday 
cages, causing Wi-Fi signals to be dropped between floors. Ideally, one’s elevator 
mates would wait for my Wi-Fi to reconnect, so I could drive myself off the 
elevator and onto the new floor. This is a very considerate thing to do, but often 
they might only place one’s robot self on the correct floor facing a wall. Then one 
“wakes up” uncertain of whether you are on the correct floor. Of course, less 
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considerate (or more oblivious) souls may not let one out of the elevator at all or 
perhaps place my robot self on a floor at random by accident or out of malice. In a 
way it is an improvement over clutching the elevator railings for dear life, hoping 
that the bounce that able-bodied peoples’ knees can take does not cause you to 
topple over. It is certainly an improvement over crawling up or down stairs on 
one’s hand or knees when overcome with fatigue and pain, which at least  makes 
disability visible and allows for advocacy. However, with my robot self, there is 
the fear of becoming trapped in an elevator and that fear is a new form of invisible 
disability. Fear of losing one’s robot self and getting that dreaded email: 
“Subject: [Beam] Jennifer Rode's Beam has run out of battery 
Jennifer Rode's Beam has run out of battery 
Jennifer Rode's Beam shut down due to low battery.” 
Suddenly, one’s robot self, one’s agency, is cut off. You are stranded elsewhere, 
unable to return until one’s robot body is rescued. This means asking a ‘local’ to 
fetch your robot ‘corpse’ and drag it back to a docking station to be recharged. 
This is worse than sitting in the hallway of a conference with a busted scooter 
waiting for the repairman, because without battery you become invisible. It is 
worse than having to crawl up or down a flight of stairs when the only elevator is 
broken or on to a conference stage to give a talk when they forgot your ramp. At 
that moment, all of a sudden crawling does not seem so bad, because at least you 
can see and be seen. 
Sure, in some future incarnation one can hack the beam to ensure there is 
signal in the elevator, the lack of which is also a problem for able-bodied people 
using the Beam. However, I use this moment to question the design decision that 
led to this possibility, a sense of privilege and ableism embedded in its design. My 
dependence on my robot self is different from able-bodied folks. I send my beam 
to where I cannot be; it is not about convenience, a temporary disability, or an 
issue with a visa that may one day be resolved. It is the portal through which I 
access the world. I am a cyborg and it is part of my sense of self. Thus, perhaps 
for me and others with disability, stable access to one’s robotic body is more 
crucial and lack of it fraught with more psychological baggage. Telepresence 
designers in their design decisions need to recognize this in order to not privilege 
the needs of the casual able-bodied convenience user.  
4.2 Embodiment & Handless Feeling 
I have no hands as a robot. I can attach things to my body—a Wi-Fi signal 
booster, or a basket to carry things. However, I cannot I knock at a door the way a 
physically present able-bodied person would. In the beginning, I would stand 
helpless at a door and wait hopefully for someone  to open it. Later, as I gained 
control of my robot self I would peer about, swinging my robot body in a circle to 
look for someone to ask for help. In the years since the conference, I have mostly 
perfected what I call the whole-body robot knock. One throws one body against 
the door as gently as possible, in an attempt to mimic a corporal knock. Usually, it 
works. Though occasionally my hand slips on the controls, or perhaps my arthritis 
acts up, and I end up startling the room’s occupants. That seems rude and 
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unfortunate, but I do not have hands. Even a gentle knock will startle someone 
who is not familiar with the whole-body robot knock. So even now I still find 
myself standing helplessly by doors, waiting.  
Once I make my hopefully not grand entrance, there is the question of 
greetings. I cannot shake hands or hug when greeting someone. So, greetings seem 
cold. On occasion, I’ve made very gentle contact with someone—knocking them 
gently. You see just as Vertisi (2008) discusses, “Seeing Like a Rover,” you can 
feel as a Beam. When I hit something, intentional or otherwise, the bottom of the 
robot stops abruptly, but the camera seated at the top of the robot, my portal to 
the world, continues forward until the center of gravity jerks it back. When this 
jostling of the camera occurs unintentionally and my attention is wholly 
immersed in my virtual presence, I find myself jerking my head back as the 
camera goes far too close to a door or other object and the hairs on my arms 
bristle. It is not painful, but the experience of hitting something remotely is none 
the less embodied. Consequently, there are opportunities to play with this seamful 
interaction (Chalmers and Galani, 2004), this sense of handless feeling. 
Dourish (2001) discusses embodied interaction as the site where humans 
interact with computer systems which “occupy our world, a world of physical and 
social reality, and that exploit this fact in how they interact with us” (p3). 
Dourish’s theory well predated robotic telepresence, but can be extended to 
remove the duality between computer and human, and by extension the Cartesian 
duality between body and mind. Thus, handless feeling is a way I have developed 
to allow for embodied interaction by re-appropriating the technology in ways that 
I am sure the designers did not entirely intend. 
Further, one can have an active embodied physical presence in this other 
space, especially as my telepresence robot has no proximity sensor or safety 
override to slow it down as I approach an object or person. Experimentation 
ensued; what could I do? I learned that with maximum speed, momentum and a 
little skill, I could push a chair across a room. Thus, when talking to a close friend 
or colleague who says something playful, I have the option of gently nudging 
them, the way one might faux box someone. There is then a realization that one 
could be violent, even if it is only intentionally running over toes. By extension a 
greeting could become embodied; gently coming into contact with another can 
create a mediated sense of physical intimacy.  
On a more recent occasion in the last year, the video signal on my robot was 
lagging somewhat, such that my projected human movements on camera became 
a bit jerky, though my robot self was standing stationary. We were waiting for an 
event to start, and a well-meaning colleague proceeded to tease me for several 
minutes while by performing a jerky robot movement much to the amusement of 
her onlookers. These were increasingly close to the camera and violating my sense 
of personal space, or should I say cyborg space. At some point, I felt a bit 
objectified, mocked for my robot self and technical limitations, and she just was 
uncomfortably close. After briefly considering whether I had adequate bandwidth 
to safely do so, I decided to assert myself. I very carefully and gingerly moved my 
robot self, very quickly to what I believe to be about two inches forward, and then 
abruptly stopped, abruptly invading her personal space. My colleague jumped 
back with a shriek of frightened surprise and then joined the rest of my colleagues 
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on both sides of the camera and laughed heartily. I might have limitations as my 
robot self, but I still have agency and in doing so I reasserted my humanity. 
4.3 Agency, Embodiment and Comings and Goings 
One aspect of life as a cyborg with limited agency is with regards to the 
circumstances under which you enter the room. On my second occasion using the 
Beam, I arrived in the room where Beams were docked. The room was also the 
headquarters for the conference staff, and thus was secure and large enough to 
store a half dozen Beams. I entered the room to discover that I had crashed a 
birthday party for one of my senior colleagues. They had just wheeled in the cake 
which was blocking my exit from the room. There was a mixture of shock, 
laughter, and uncertainty. I felt extraordinarily rude crashing the party; after all I 
was not invited, and everyone else were senior members of the Ubicomp program 
committee. Still telepresence requires adapting as social norms are overturned 
inadvertently, so after an awkward moment I jokingly offered to take a “Beam 
selfie” with him. I joined the party singing Happy Birthday. The guest of honor 
cut the cake, and going with the obvious joke I was immediately offered a piece, 
which I politely declined. I felt rude not being able to accept, but we laughed. As 
the serving trolley moved about the room to allow the cake to be served, it no 
longer physically blocked me from moving. I made my polite excuses and left.  
This conversation as to whether I would like cake momentarily made me 
realize that while my senses of touch and sight extended to my experiences in 
Seattle, my senses of taste and smell were still rooted firmly in Philadelphia. I felt 
momentary torn, embodied in neither place. I love cake, yet I could not smell the 
vanilla frosting. Nor could I take a bite of cake that looked truly delicious. 
Consequently, my sense of immersion shattered. Further, while it was truly funny 
to remark on my inability to eat, and it was well intended levity attempting to 
smooth an awkward social situation, nonetheless it was commentary on my 
disability. I was handless, and I could not eat. I was other. Again, while my 
physical disabilities were augmented with this new technology, I encountered new 
disabilities by choosing this alternate cyborg form. This is in line with Herring et 
al.’s research (2016) that discusses how even able-bodied persons in telepresence 
robots are treated as somewhat disabled. In that way, I was not that different from 
an able-bodied person using a telepresence robot. While at the same time realizing 
that I was oversensitive, I also recognized some new form of corporeal-ableism at 
the core of this interaction. Yet, while I cannot become able-bodied, I recognize 
my new-found ability: I can select whether to attend an event in person or as a 
cyborg in essence select the forms of disability I wish to present to the world. 
I, similarly, had little control on when I left a social interaction. On one 
occasion, I was being interviewed about my experience using a telepresence robot, 
and mid-interview my Wi-Fi connection dropped. Suddenly, I was transported 
from my embodied world in Seattle and back to Philadelphia. When talking to the 
reporter, I had borrowed a colleague’s robot as mine was having technical 
difficulty. In my hurry to get back to the interview, I logged back in to the wrong 
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robot. Consequently, rather than reappearing in the robot right next to the 
reporter, I logged into one back in the conference chair’s room. As I rolled back to 
the reporter, I startled her. The poor woman shrieked audibly, and commented 
that I startled her. I felt like I was playing one of those role-playing video games 
where I had to visit my corpse to restart the game.  
Again, this reminded me of the fragility of this form of communication as a 
complement for my disability. I was dependent on the internet and ultimately on a 
link that lacked any tangible form. This fragility made me feel intensely 
vulnerable, as it mediated my presence at an academic conference, where 
interpersonal networking is crucial for my professional status and ultimately the 
perception of my reliability as a colleague.  
5 Conclusion 
In this essay, I have reflected on my initial experiences using telepresence. I have 
engaged in a tremendous amount of articulation work to try to make this tool 
work for me. In some ways, the technology affords me significant newly found 
freedoms and in others is profoundly restricting. I strive for an embodied 
experience and while I have developed a sense of cyborg space and handless 
feeling, in other instances the immersion can be broken and I become painfully 
aware of my physical separateness. Further, issues of agency and ableism become 
conflated as in some ways technical limitations can reaffirm and even create new 
forms of disability. As more and more computer science conferences allow this 
form of ‘attendance,’ we need to consider the social implications for those of us 
with disabilities. Further, in some instances I have seen remote participation 
being used as a way of accommodating disabled persons, instead of ensuring the 
actual physical space is accessible. Technology, then, can be used to reify these 
new forms of cyborg disability. 
Throughout this experience I have become a cyborg. Disability studies scholar, 
Tobin Siebers (2008), theorizes disability as a minority identity, and challenges 
readers to consider embracing it as a positive, writing,  
To reverse the negative connotations of disability… it will be necessary to claim the 
value and variety of disability in ways that may seem strange to readers who have little 
experience with disability studies. But it is vital to show to what extent the ideology of 
ability collapses once we “claim disability” as a positive identity (Linton). 
He argues doing so improves quality of life for disabled people (Siebers, 2008). 
Thus, by acknowledging I have become a cyborg, I am making a political 
statement. It requires a tremendous amount of articulation work to deal with the 
technology limitations and stigma of disability, both present in everyday life and 
in the design of the technology itself (which itself create new forms of invisible 
disability). By embracing the positive aspects of my disability and becoming a 
cyborg using telepresence, I am afforded a new form of an activist disabled 
identity. Managing it requires negotiating issues of presence, embodiment and 
agency, which as I have shown need to be re-theorized to fully consider this new 
type of hybrid disabled cyborg identity. While this essay has not presented 
solutions, it provides clear illustration of problems with articulation work to 
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ensure embodiment, agency, and ableism. As we move forward with the 
development of telepresence the issues of social justifice for the disabled need to 
be carefully considered.  
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